Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 3 Symposium: Current Issues in
Securities Regulation

Article 6

4-15-1992

Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws
Douglas M. Branson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Courts Commons, Litigation Commons, Securities
Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Douglas M. Branson Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 3
(1992)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol19/iss3/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Collateral Participant Liability Under
State Securities Laws
Douglas M. Branson*

As I lecture continuing legal education groups, or consult in the securities litigation field, the questions practitioners frequently ask do
not involve internationalization of securities markets, or insider trading, or failure of the national market system to evolve. By a ratio of
four, five, or more to one, practitioners ask about collateral participants' involvement in securities transactions and the potential liability resulting from that involvement.'
"Collateral participant," of course, is a generic name frequently applied to attorneys, accountants, appraisers, investment bankers, consulting engineers, commercial bankers, business consultants,
celebrity spokespersons, corporate directors, and other similarly situated individuals. These individuals have become defendants in lawsuits because someone with whom they have had a relationship,
2
usually the issuer of securities, has violated the securities laws.
When deals go bad, disappointed investors invoke the securities laws
3
to name as defendants great numbers of collateral participants.
Due to developments at the federal level, including United States
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A. 1965, University of Notre
Dame; J.D. 1970, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1974, University of Virginia.
1. The next most frequently discussed topic seems to be exemptions from registration, particularly those contained in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. 240.501-509. See generally D., Selecting and Complying With
Exemptions from Registration, Chapter C, in UNIV. OF WASHINGTON CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, SECURITIES REGULATION FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER (1991).
2. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, CollateralParticipantLiability Under the SecuritiesLaws-Charting the ProperCourse, 65 OR. L. REV. 327, 329-330 (1986).
3. The record number of collateral participants named as defendants may have
been in In re Washington Public Power Supply System Litigation, No. MDL 551 (W.D.
Wash. filed July 15, 1983) (over 700 defendants named). Other examples include Armstrong v. McAlpin, 669 F. 2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1983) (57 Page complaint alleging 20 causes
of action against 30 individual defendants); McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp.
631 (N.D. Calif. 1983) (42 defendants); In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation, BLUE
SKY L. REP. (CCH) 73,277 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (37 defendants named); Roberts v. Heim,
BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 72,616 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (over 100 defendants named).

1027

Supreme Court opinions in 1975 in Ernst & Ernst v. Hockfelder4 and
in 1988 in Pinterv. Dahl,5 federal courts have modified and narrowed
the bases for collateral participant liability. Narrowing of liability
under federal law has shifted plaintiffs' focus to state securities, or
blue sky, laws.
Unlike federal law, most state securities acts allow successful
plaintiffs also to recover attorneys' fees. 6 Availability of attorneys'
fees has sharpened this focus on state law. State law then has
become the area in which practitioners' questions, and angst,
proliferate.
This angst increases because few, if any, answers exist. Until recently, the number of state court published appellate opinions has
been small. The number of recent decisions has increased but outcomes vary greatly, bouncing from one extreme to the other, like an
inebriate navigating a wide thoroughfare.
For example, the Washington State Supreme Court has affirmed liability imposed upon seemingly industrious and diligent outside directors of a failed high tech venture. 7 Oregon's Supreme Court has
also interpreted Oregon's statute expansively, holding an Idaho attorney liable for preparing offering documents in securities transactions
touching Oregon. 8 Oregon practitioners have predicted a "parade of
horribles" as an aftermath of the decision 9 and, without success, have
sought legislative change.lO By contrast, California courts have steadfastly adhered to a narrow, strict privity test for collateral participant
liability, at least under one key provision of the California Corporations Code." x
For my contribution to this securities law symposium, then, I have
4. 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (mere negligence would not suffice for recovery of money
damages under SEC Rule 10b-5). See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980)
(Hochfelder principle applied to SEC actions for prophylactic relief).
5. 486 U.S. 622 (1988) (eliminating broader substantial factor test and confining
broadened seller status and liability under Securities Act § 12(1) to those defendants
who solicited the plaintiff).
6. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 5.55.220(a) ("reasonable attorneys' fees"); ARIz. REV.
STAT. § 44-2001 ("taxable court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees"); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 59.115(2) ("costs and reasonable attorneys' fees at trial and on appeal"); WASH. REV.
CODE § 21.20.430(1)&(2) (provision for a "reasonable attorneys' fee").
7. See Hines v. Data Line Systems, Inc. 787 P.2d 8 (Wash. 1990).
8. See Prince v. Brydon, 764 P.2d 1370 (1988).
9. See generally Gary M. Berne & Neil Bregenzer, ParticipantsLiability Under
the Oregon Securities Law after Prince v. Brydon, 68 OR. L. REV. 885 (1989) (predicting
that a parade of horribles is unlikely to ensue).
10. See Professionals'Liability Bill Dies in Oregon House After Senate Passage,23
FED. SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1085 (BNA) (July 12, 1991).
11. See infra notes 115-125 and accompanying text, discussing CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 25501, the general antifraud civil liability provision of the California Corporate Securities Code of 1968. Furthermore, in Lubin v. Sybedon Corporation, 688 F. Supp.
1425, 1453 (S.D. Cal. 1988), Judge Enright held that privity with the issuer is necessary
under all, or nearly all, civil liability provisions of the California statute.
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chosen a mundane and pedestrian topic - collateral participant liability under state securities acts. With respect to that topic, my goals
are likewise mundane and modest. I will elaborate on some possible
alternative interpretations of statutes and point to the policy considerations favoring one choice over any other. Downsizing my contribution still further, I will confine my discussion to the Pacific Rim
states: Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, and Hawaii. An occasional decision from farther afield is tossed into the mix if, but only
if, by way of contrast or elaboration the decision can aid in construction of a similar statute in one of the Pacific Rim jurisdictions, or act
as a beacon on the uncharted, unruly sea that state securities law
seems to have become.
II.
A.

SETTING THE STAGE

Developments on the FederalLevel: SEC Rule 10b-5 and Aiding
and Abetting

By the early 1970s, after a collage of Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals precedents, a securities plaintiff needed merely to demonstrate that she had purchased or sold securities at or about the same
time the defendant had misrepresented or omitted to state material
facts. Gone were most analogies to elements of a common law fraud
action, including a reliance requirement, 12 a loss causation requirement,1 3 and any requirement of fault beyond mere negligence.14
Courts even judged materiality of the omitted or misrepresented fact
under a relaxed standard that a reasonable investor just "might"
have considered the fact important in making his or her decision.15
The standing requirement, that the plaintiff bought or sold securities
in order to journey past the federal courtroom door, also gave way in
at least two federal circuits.' 6 Prodded by hard cases, those circuit
12. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
(1972) (reliance is presumed in cases involving nondisclosure in face-to-face transactions); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Penner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239-40 (2d
Cir. 1974) (reliance presumed in case of misrepresentation rather than omission).
13. See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976) (attempting to
reinstate at least some causal connection between plaintiff's loss and defendant's loss
and defendant's alleged wrongdoing).
14. See, e.g., City Nat'l. Bank v. Vanderbloom, 442 F.2d 221, 229-30 (8th Cir. 1970);
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965) (mere negligence would
suffice).
15. See Affiliated Ute Citizens 406 U.S. at 154; Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 384 (1970).
16. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 492 F.2d 136, 141-42 (9th Cir.
1974) (es*ablishing a new exception to standing rule), rev'd 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Eason
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courts of appeals moved to a more existentialist and looser test of
standing. In these efforts, the Ninth Circuit lead the way on many
17
issues.
Beginning in the mid 1970s, the Supreme Court began a program of
tightening up the securities laws' coverage that later became one of
most pronounced, but little-noticed, jurisprudential swings anywhere
and certainly the most pronounced change wrought by the Burger
Court.' 8 In this dramatic swing of the pendulum, at least two cases
directly affected collateral participant liability and figure prominently in the resurgence of state law.
First, of course, was Ernst & Ernst v. HochJfelder,19 a case in which
plaintiffs sought to pinion aiding and abetting securities fraud, or rule
10b-5, liability on an outside accounting firm. Justice Powell began
by discussing, under rule 10b-5, "whether an action for civil damages
may lie ... in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud."20 The entire discussion focused on whether a
mere lack of reasonable care, or negligence, will suffice. The Court
held that it would not. Securities Exchange Act section 10(b),21 pursuant to which the SEC promulgated rule 10b-5, speaks in terms of
manipulation and "deceptive device or contrivance." These are near
terms of art connotating a state of mind or fault requirement higher
than mere lack of reasonable care. 22 To the extent that on its face
the SEC rule prohibits making "any untrue statement of a material
fact" or omitting "to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made . . .not misleading," language devoid of any
state of mind requirement whatsoever, the scope of the rule cannot
exceed the scope of the statute pursuant to which it has been
23
adopted.
Hochfelder left open whether more severe forms of negligence,
such as gross negligence or recklessness, would suffice to ground rule
lOb-5 liability. 2 4 The manner in which Justice Powell crafted his

opinion, in particular leaving unresolved the interstice between
v. GMAC, 490 F.2d 654, 657-61 (7th Cir. 1973) (abolishing rule altogether), cert. denied,

416 U.S. 960 (1974).
17. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975) (dispensing with
proof of reliance in case of affirmative misrepresentation); Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d
at 141-42 (modifying standing requirement); Royal Air Properties v. Smith, 312 F.2d
210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) (mere negligence sufficient); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274
(9th Cir. 1961) (same).
18. See, e.g., Thomas Hazen, Symposium Introduction - The Supreme Court and
the Securities Laws: Has the Pendulum Slowed?, 30 EMORY L. J. 5 (1981).
19. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
20. Id. at 187-88.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78b.
22. 425 U.S. at 197-99.
23. Id. at 212-14.
24. Id. at 193-94, n.12.
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knowing and intentional conduct on one hand, and mere negligence
on the other, has led to much posturing. Keying on Justice Powell's
opening sentence, defense lawyers have boldly asserted that allegation and proof of scienter is necessary. Reading the entire opinion,
plaintiffs allow only that negligence no longer will suffice but that
recklessness or other more severe forms of misfeasance are
sufficient.
After Hochfelder, almost all federal circuits have answered this
question, largely, but not wholly, in plaintiffs' favor.25 They have
held that recklessness, but only of a more severe sort, would suffice.
That severe sort of recklessness had to amount to lack of even the
slightest care, giving rise to an inference that the defendant had acted in conscious disregard of the effect his conduct could have on
others.26 But proof of intentional, purposeful wrongdoing was not
necessary.
Under rule 10b-5, the secondary liability concept plaintiffs most
frequently utilize is aiding and abetting. Other means of capturing
collateral participants exist, such as conspiracy or respondeat superior on the common law side,27 or the securities laws' controlling persons provisions on the statutory side.28 But overwhelmingly
plaintiffs attempt to cast a wider rule 10b-5 net with aiding and abetting allegations.2 9
25. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for Reckless Misrepresentation and
Omissions Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L.
REV. 667, 674 n.22 (1991) (noting that every circuit that has addressed the issue has
found that recklessness satisfies the Hochfelder state of mind requirement); Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violators of Rule 10b-5: The Recklessness Standard in
Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1087, 1090 n.19 (1984).
26. See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) (the
Rule 10b-5 recklessness requirement "comes closer to being a lesser form of intent
than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence"); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d. 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) ("recklessness
required is of a high sort, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care"). See also Hollinger V. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (adopting Sunstrand as unified standard in the circuit).
27. See, e.g., Hollinger V. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1576 (9th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (statutes controlling person's liability supplements, but does not supplant,
common law principles of respondeat superior); In re Atlantic Fin. Management, Inc.,
784 F.2d 29, 32-34 (1st Cir. 1986).
28. Securities Act of 1933 § 15 U.S.C. § 77(o) (1988); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988).
29. See, e.g., Alan A. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud, A CriticalExamination, 52 ALA. L. REV. 637, 643 (1988). Traditionally
the leading work has been David S. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In PariDelicto, Indemnification,and
Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597 (1972).
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Although formulae vary slightly from decision to decision, aiding
and abetting has three elements: (1) the existence of a securities law
violation by the primary violator, usually the issuer of the securities;
(2) the rendering of substantial assistance by the collateral participant to the primary violator; and (3) rendering this assistance while
generally aware of or with knowledge that the primary violator was
violating the law. 30 Alternatively, in the exercise of even the slightest care, the collateral participant should have known that the primary violator was violating the law. 3 '
As any experienced business litigator knows, the last element,
state of mind, or fault, is the key to any fraud case. Alleging and
proving that an attorney, or an appraiser or some other collateral
participant, has failed to exercise even the slightest care, when courts
have interpreted that as recklessness of the high conscious disregard
variety, is difficult.32 Complicating the scene further is many federal
courts' flat statement that the alleged aider and abettor must have
known that the primary violator was violating the law. 33 Those
courts' statements not only reflect the trend toward a knowledge
standard but also are instructive in showing where courts' sympathies might lie.
B. Developments on the FederalLevel: Securities Act Section 12
and Broadened Seller Status
The fallout of these developments on the rule 10b-5 and aiding and
abetting fronts was to shift plaintiffs' attention elsewhere. Attention
shifted to the Securities Act of 1933 section 12(2). That section imposed primary liability on those who have sold a security by means of
a false or misleading written or oral prospectus. The raison d'etre of
30. See, e.g., Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 29, at 662; Ruder, supra note 29,
at 632-33. The general awareness standard, perhaps a shade below knowledge, comes
from SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 nn.29-30 (6th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975) (aider and abettor must have had at least "general awareness that [her] role
was part of an overall activity that was improper").
31. See, e.g., Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 29, at 663-64, 676-683 ("reckless
disregard" standard).
32. See, e.g., Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829, 845 (S.D. Cal. 1985) (refusing to
find attorney possessed the requisite state of mind, despite four years' extensive legal
work and knowledge of fraudulent financial planner scam perpetrated by client real
estate developers).
33. See, e.g., Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 822 (1983); In re U.S. Grant Hotel Associates, Ltd., 740 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D.
Cal. 1990) ("In order to establish aider and abettor liability, a plaintiff must show...
actual knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor of the wrong.") More stringent are
cases such as Wright v. Schock, 571 F.Supp. 642, 662-63, afJ'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.
1984) ("actual knowledge by the alleged aider and abettor of the wrong and of his or
her role in furthering it"); B.K. Medical Sys. v. Clesh, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
§ 92,301 (W.D. Pa. 1984) ("[tlhat the aider-abettor knowingly and substantially participated in the wrongdoing").
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the shift to section 12 is the state of mind requirement. Under section 12(2), the fault requirement is mere lack of reasonable care.
Moreover, it is the defendant who must sustain the burden of proof
that she did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of the untruth or omission. And under section
12(1), which imposes liability for failures to register, the liability is
strict liability.
The hitch in applying section 12 is that liability is limited to sellers.
Plaintiffs, though, achieved a fair but somewhat limited measure of
success in shoehorning a variety of collateral participants into broadened definitions of who sellers are under the securities laws. Various
circuits adopted various tests ranging from narrow to quite broad.
During the 1980s, though, plaintiffs and commentators shifted their
attention to Securities Act section 12(2) and broadened seller
status. 34
In summary, under rule 10b-5 collateral participants generally will
be held liable, if at all, under common law aiding and abetting secondary liability concepts. The net a plaintiff can cast is wide but significantly limited by the high degree of fault a plaintiff must prove.
Under section 12(2) for section 12(2), the net a plaintiff can cast is
not nearly so wide. The tradeoff, however, is that mere negligence
will suffice. In cases of registration violations, no fault at all need be
proven.
Other theories of collateral participant liability may exist but aiding and abetting and broadened seller status have become the primary two. Some plaintiffs attempt to cross over, mixing and
matching these two weapons, as in alleging that defendants aided and
abetted a section 12 violation. These plaintiff assertions give conservative commentators fits but have made little, if any, headway
with courts. 35
By the mid 1980s, the basic law of the land was rule 10b-5, with aid34. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 2, at 335 n.41 (almost all commentary from 198186 focused on section 12 rather than on aiding and abetting and Rule 10b-5).
35. See, e.g., SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982); Pharo
v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 669 (5th Cir. 1980); Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp. 1465, 1486
(D. Or. 1985) (the "better reasoning" is no aider and abettor liability); In re Diasonics,
599 F. Supp. 447, 458 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (aiding and abetting would "eviscerate" other
tests courts have developed for use with section 12); Hokama v. E.F. Hutton, 566 F.
Supp. 636, 642 (C.D. Cal. 1983). As to commentators, see Patricia A. O'Hara, Erosion of
the PrivacyRequirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, The Expanded
Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921, 982 & 985 (1984) (calling use of aiding and
abetting under section 12(2) a "machination" and the "ultimate bootstrap").
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ing and abetting allegations as to collateral participants, and section
12(2), with broadened seller status, each with its own advantages and
limitations. Finally, the balance gradually was beginning to tip toward section 12 and its lower state of mind requirements.
In 1988, Pinter v. Dahl36 changed all of that. In a Securities Act
section 12(1) (failure to register) rather than 12(2) (false or misleading prospectus) case, the Supreme Court returned to the text of the
statute. The Court limited seller status to those who sold or solicited
the sale of the security, or actually participated in those efforts.
Although the Securities Act broadly defines "sell" and "offer to sell,"
the Supreme Court discarded broader tests such as "substantial factor in the transaction," or "substantial factor in the sale," as without
37
foundation in the statute's text.
Moreover, the Court held that only those collateral participants
who have some direct financial or economic stake in the sale can be
held liable. The uncompensated volunteer who, out of excess enthusiasm or a desire to have other investors in the same boat, solicits or
sells, cannot be held liable. Probably, too, a temporal requirement
exists. The defendant must have solicited or sold at or about the
point of sale, to use a test the Eighth Circuit grafted onto section
12.38
Pinter v. Dahl thus introduced a bright line and somewhat restrictive test of broadened seller status. In subsequent cases, lower federal courts have been quick to embrace and apply it.39 The result has
been a shift to state law to fill whatever void, real or imagined, that
0
exists in the wake of these federal court decisions.4
36. 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
37. See, e.g., id, at 648-51 ("The deficiency of the substantial factor test is that it
divorces the analysis... from any reference to the applicable statutory language.").
38. See Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 888 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The point of sale is a
crucial step in the Act's disclosure system ....
The sale point assumes this importance because it is the occasion where ... relevant information can be obtained from
the seller and disclosed to the buyer.").
39. At the court of appeals level alone, the decisions are becoming numerous and
uniform, invariably finding no liability. See, e.g., Wade v. Skipper's, Inc., 915 F.2d 1324,
1328-29 (9th Cir. 1990) (collateral participant corporation not a seller); Insurance Co. of
N. A. v. Dealy, 911 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (5th Cir.1990) (issuer of surety bond not a seller
of oil and gas partnership units); Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531,
538-40 (9th Cir. 1989) (attorneys, accountants, and stockbrokers not sellers); Royal Am.
Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1017 (2d Cir. 1989) (attorney who
attended portions of all sales meetings who was also director and executive committee
member of issuer held not a seller); Crawford v. Glenn's, Inc., 876 F.2d 507, 512 (5th
Cir. 1989) (corporate officer of non-issuer who had not dealt with plaintiff not a seller);
Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989) (law
firm's "ministerial act" of mailing private placement memorandum to investor "cannot
under any view be considered the kind of solicitation required under Pinter"); Abell v.
Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1115 (5th Cir. 1988) (law firm that had prepared misleading offering circular not a seller).
40. An even more radical contraction of federal law's reach is presaged by deci-
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C. CollateralParticipantLiability: Tactics, Strategy and Policy
Obviously, plaintiffs name collateral participants as defendants to
reach deep pockets, or to reach any pocket at all. In the usual case,
the primary violator, the issuer, is insolvent or defunct.
Plaintiffs' lawyers, though, usually are more sophisticated than
that. They name as defendants anyone with any possible culpability
and begin discovery. Typically, defendants, or their lawyers, do not
cooperate in defense. They reserve the right to point fingers, blaming each other. More often, actual finger-pointing begins soon after
discovery has commenced. Escalating further, defendants formalize
finger-pointing by filing third party complaints, bringing into the case
still additional defendants, or by filing cross-claims against those codefendants already in the case.
This typical lack of cooperation, and the predictability of it,
whatever its source may be, is fertile ground that permits plaintiffs to
proceed to step two. Step one, of course, is naming a number of defendants. Step two is utilizing the tactical device game theorists call
the prisoners' dilemma.41 Once through the discovery process, if
probable culpability has been established, plaintiffs will isolate one or
two of the peripheral but culpable defendants, reaching a settlement
with them that the defendant cannot refuse, given the cost of a probable trial, or a trial plus adverse publicity. By payment into its coffers of the settlement amount, the plaintiff fattens its war chest and
proceeds. The path down which the plaintiff proceeds may have way
stations working the prisoners' dilemma still further with additional
party defendants, or may lead straight to the courthouse and trial.
The key for defendants, of course, is cooperation. If culpability exists, they should undertake coordinated, rather than individual, settlement efforts early. If the consensus is that no one has done
anything wrong, and plaintiffs' loss is due to changed business conditions or good faith errors in judgement, defendants should present a
sions such as Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3rd Cir. 1991)
(holding that Securities Act section 12(2) is limited to the initial offering stage and has
no application to other securities trades). See also T. Rowe Price New Horizons Fund,
Inc. v. Preletz, 749 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md. 1990). But see Therese H. Maynard, Liability
Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 for Fraudulent Trading in Postdistribution Markets, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 847, 848 (1991) (decisions represents a
"strained and rather distorted reading of the statute").
41. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). See
also Robert Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoners'Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLIcT RES.
379 (1980); Robert Harris, Note on Optimal Policies for the Prisoners' Dilemma, 76
PSYCH. REV. 375 (1969).

1035

unified or at least coordinated defense effort, reserving the fingerpointing until later. In the typical case, however, they never do.
Defendants' biggest aid then has not been common sense but federal courts. Hochfelder, Pinterv. Dahl, and their progeny have had
the effect of limiting the ability of plaintiffs to work the prisoners'
dilemma. Plaintiffs cannot name as many defendants, or present colorable claims against them, as before. One method of viewing the resurgence of state law is an attempt by plaintiffs to regain at least
some of the strategic ground that has been lost on the federal level.42
More from a policy than a strategy standpoint, the turn toward
state law may have its genesis in erroneous policy assumptions by
federal courts. Especially with the Dahl solicitation test, but also
with the aiding and abetting substantial assistance and knowledge requirements, the judicial assumption seems to be that collateral participants should be found at fault when they have become overinvolved in the primary violator's activity. Actual selling efforts,
whether born of an excess of greed or enthusiasm, are the paradigm
of over-involvement. And, indeed, liability, or the specter of it in
such cases, seems proper.
There is, however, another side. Many collateral participants are
culpable and should be held liable, not because they over-perform
but because they knowingly or recklessly under-perform.43 The attorney who because of ignorance of securities law, or perhaps more
likely a desire to get or retain the client's other legal business, turns
a blind eye to a registration or a disclosure violation, is as culpable as
one who over-performs. An appraiser who gives a high appraisal
based upon incomplete analysis and labels it "for client's eyes only,"
knowing full well that the document will be a keystone in selling a
deal, under-performs but seems culpable. 44 The accountant who
42. Yet another tactical difficulty with federal legal requirements is that, as
against professional defendants such as attorneys or accountants, by alleging higher
states of mind, plaintiffs may plead themselves into professional malpractice policies'
exclusions for intentional misconduct. Plaintiffs may enhance their legal case but simultaneously plead and prove themselves out of any chance for a generous settlement
or recovery. These ubiquitous exclusions furnish yet another reason to turn to state
laws, among which lower state of mind requirements have come to predominate. See
infma notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
43. Some older decisions recognize and codify this but the recent trend has been
the other way. As to the former, see, e.g., SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2nd Cir.
1968) ("A lawyer, no more than others can escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes
to what he saw and could readily understand."); Adams v. American Western Sec.,
Inc., 510 P.2d 838, 843-44 (Or. 1973) (an attorney who performs only routine legal work
nonetheless will be held liable if he has actual knowledge that the client has or is violating the securities laws).
44. See, e.g., Buffo v. Graddick, 742 F.2d 592, 594 (11th Cir. 1984) (appraisal of
$720,000 on land arguably worth only $18,000); Schmidt v. Cornerstone Investments,
Inc., 795 P.2d 1143, 1145 (Wash. 1990) (appraisal of $460,000 on commercial property
months early appraised at $120,000-155,000).
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prepares track record data for a repeat syndicator or an investment
advisor, knowing it to be puffed considerably, but labels it a "compilation," under-performs and thus escapes liability but may be as culpable as the primary defendant. Raising the long glass to the blind
eye, as Horatio Nelson did at the Battle of the Nile when signaled to
retreat, has always been common among many classes of collateral
participants in business deals.
Arguably, under federal securities law, blind eye practices now are
encouraged by the legal test applicable to those collateral participants. Over and over these cases arise: the lawyer, the accountant,
the appraiser, -the corporate director, or the banker turns a blind eye
toward suspected wrongdoing. With the solicitation test under Securities Act section 12, and substantial assistance and knowledge requirements for rule 10b-5 aiding and abetting, plaintiffs have great
obstacles to surmount in many cases in which collateral participants
should be held responsible, in whole or in part, for the financial
losses that have occurred. From a policy standpoint, two questions
should arise. Should that void be filled? Does state securities law already go all or part of the way in filling any void that may exist with
45
regard to collateral participants in securities transactions?
II.

A.

LIABILITY UNDER STATE LAW

Statutory Patterns
The dominant state statute is the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.

45. The other antipode is deputizing accountants, lawyers, and others as "traffic
cops of fraud," assigning to them a duty of plenary inquiry into clients' ventures and
activities. That extreme reached its apotheosis with the White and Case whistleblowing case, in which the SEC contended that upon discovering material omissions in
merger documents, a lawyer should have withdrawn and notified the SEC if the client
attempted to go forward. See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682
(D.D.C. 1978). At about the same time, a respected SEC Commissioner, Al Sommer,
made a famous speech in which he gave currency to the traffic cops of fraud idea. See
Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-74 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,631 (Jan. ; 1974). The SEC soon backed off from
its extreme position. See In re Carter & Johnson, SEC RELEASE No. 34-17397 (Feb.
28, 1981) (only whistleblowing duty alleged is to higher-ups within the organization
represented). Today no one contends that lawyers, accountants, or other collateral
participants are duty bound to root out, let alone blow the whistle on, client frauds. Be
that as it may, closing one's eyes to a fraud one knows or has firm suspicions is occurring, and continuing to be involved, is a far different matter than action as a traffic cop
of fraud, See, e.g., Adams v. Am. West Securities, Inc., 510 P.2d 838 (Or. 1973). See also
Martin B. Robbins, Policeman, Conscience or Confidant Thoughts on the Appropriate
Response of a Securities Attorney Who Suspects Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws, 15 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 373 (1982).
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That statute has been the law of thirty-seven jurisdictions.46 The
Uniform Act, however, is not uniform, as states have adopted a
"model" rather than uniform act approach to it, enacting substantial
local variations, both at the time of original enactment and
subsequently.
In 1985, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws updated the
Uniform Securities Act, in part motivated by a desire to reintroduce
uniformity. 4 7 Six states have adopted the 1985 version, three being
states that had the uniform statute previously and upgraded to the
1985 model.48 The other three states represent new adoptions, bringing the number of Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions to approxi49
mately forty.
Of the Pacific Rim states, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii
have adopted versions of the 1956 Uniform Securities Act. By contrast, California has a home-grown state securities act. 50
B.

Civil Liability Provisions

Essentially, the beginning point in analyzing federal law is common law. Applicable federal statutes and rules apply only to "any
person"51 or to "any person who offers or sells."5 2 They are cryptic
enactments. The need to resort to case law and commentary to give
53
meaning to those terms is immediate.
In contrast, state securities laws have civil liability provisions more
detailed than their cryptic federal counterparts. These civil liability
provisions thus require more attention before resort is had to the
case law.
The civil liability provision of the 1956 Uniform Securities Act provides that "[a]ny person who ... offers or sells a security in violation
of [registration requirements] . . . is liable to the person buying the
46. See 7B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 509 (1985) (table of 36 states and Puerto Rico).
47. See generally HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE MEETING IN
ITS NINETY FOUR YEAR at 349 (1985) (hereinafter COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS-PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL MEETING (1985)).

48. Those states all are Rocky Mountain or Western States: Colorado, Nevada and
New Mexico. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT., Article 51 (prefatory table of adopting states)
(1990 & Supp. 1991).
49. Id. (Maine & Vermont). Apparently, South Dakota also has adopted the 1985
version.
50. CALIF. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (1968). California's neighbor to the east, Arizona, also has a home grown securities act. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003
(1951).
51. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5.
52. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771.
53. Cf. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (long, complex statutory provision naming several classes of collateral participants who become primarily liable for

material misrepresentations or omissions in registered offerings).
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security from him ....
54 The seller or offeror also is liable if he
"offers or sells a security by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or omnits to state a material fact ....-55 The question that
arises is the same as that under Securities Act of 1933 section 12.
That question is how expansive are the terms "seller," and "any per-

son who offers or sells."
Arguably, seller is not elastic at all, for the very next subsection of
the civil liability provision deals with individuals other than sellers,
naming some but by no means all categories of frequently seen collateral participants:
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable (for registration violations], every partner, officer, or director of such a seller [who has violated registration rules], every person occupying a similar status or
performing similar functions, every employee of such a seller who materially
aids in the sale .. is liable unless the non-seller who is so liable sustains the
burden of proof that he did not know, and in [the] exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the
liability is alleged to exist. 56

Oregon has made its collateral participant provision much more expansive, although the basic framework is still Uniform Securities Act
section 410. In addition to "every partner, officer or director," Oregon's statute holds liable "every [other] person who participates or
materially aids in the sale." 57 That phrase is an expansive substitution for the original narrow language, which merely adds to the list
"every employee of the seller who materially aids in the sale."5 8
Washington's version of the Uniform Act reflects only fine tuning
done by the Legislature. Washington makes the civil liability provision applicable to buyers as well as to sellers. 59 Washington retains
54. UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 410(a)(1), T UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 643 (1985).

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id, at (a)(2).
Id.

OR. REV. ST'AT. § 59.115 (Supp. 1991).
Arizona has a statute with similar language and express reach. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1987) ("An action ... may be brought against any [person] ...
who made, participated in or induced the unlawful sale or purchase ....").See also
Strom v. Black, 523 P.2d 1339 (Ariz. App. 1974) (statute applied to business broker who
omitted material information); Trump v. Badet, 327 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Ariz. 1958) (applied to defendant attorney who acted as go-between in stock sale). Texas has a similar "any person " provision, but adds a state of mind requirement of at least
recklessness to hold other persons. See TEX. REV. STAT. § 581-33 (Vernon Supp. 1991)
("[a] person who directly or indirectly with intent to deceive or defraud or with reckless disregard for the truth or the law materially aids a seller, buyer, or issuer of a
security is liable.., jointly and severally with the seller, buyer, or issuer.").
59. See WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(2) & (3) (1990). By contrast, Oregon enacted
a duplicate civil liability provision under which buyers can be sued for registration or
antifraud violations. See OR.REV. STAT. § 59.127 (1989).
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the original "employee . . . who materially aids in the transaction,"
but adds to the list "every broker-dealer, salesperson, or person exempt under the provisions of RCW 21.21.040 who materially aids in
the transaction."60
Alaska follows the latter change, also adding to employees, "every
broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale." 61 Hawaii has
taken Uniform Act section 410 and collapsed it all into a single sentence of a single statutory subsection. That sentence reads "Every
sale made in violation of this chapter shall be voidable . . . and the
person making the sale and every director, officer, or agent of or for
the seller, if the director, officer or agent has personally participated
or aided in any way in making the sale, shall be jointly and severally
liable ... ,"62
Unlike Oregon's significant expansion of the category of persons
who can be held liable, Hawaii's modification represents a contraction from the Uniform Act. The contraction is not in terms of categories of persons but in the standard of liability. Under Uniform Act
section 410, unless they can sustain their defense that in the exercise
of reasonable care they could not have known of the violation, partners, officers, and directors are liable. That is true whether or not
they have aided or participated in the transaction. Only employees
63
benefit from the modifier "who materially aids in the transaction."
Partners, directors or officers are not insurers or guarantors, because they do have an "in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known" defense. Nonetheless, they are their sibling's keeper
because they can be found liable for transactions in which they have
had no personal involvement. The effect is that to escape liability,
partners, officers and directors must make inquiry and otherwise become personally involved in an issuer's securities transaction. Several
courts have read the statute in that manner. 64 None have required
60. WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.430(3) (1990). The 1985 Uniform Act also makes the
"broker dealer" addition to the list of persons liable. Otherwise, the 1985 Act makes
only stylistic changes in the civil liability provision. See UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT of
1985 § 605 & Comment 1, COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS-PROCEEDINGS OF
ANNUAL MEETING at 461-63 (1985) (with the exception of the addition of an anti-manipulation subsection, rewriting of the section "is not intended to alter significantly existing law.").
61. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.220(c) (1991).
62. HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-20(a) (Supp. 1991).
63. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 410(a)(1), 76 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 643 (1985). It
would be otherwise if a comma had been placed after "every employee of such a
seller," as in "every partner, officer, [or] director.., every employee of such a seller[,]
who materially aids in the transaction." See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
64. See Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 16-17 (Wash. 1990). Accord Mitchell v. Beard, 513 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Ark. 1974); Arnold v. Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426, 433
(Ind. App. 1979); Taylor v. Perdition Minerals Group, Ltd., 766 P.2d 805, 810 (Kan.
1988); Rzepka v. Farm Estates, Inc., 269 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Mich. App. 1978); Foelker v.
Kwake, 568 P.2d 1369, 1373 (Or. 1977).
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that a partner, officer or director "personally participate or aid" in
the transaction. The Hawaii Legislature, though, has imposed such
65
an additional requirement on partner, officer or director liability.
C. CaliforniasApproach
California devotes an entire chapter of its code to civil liability. 66
To understand that chapter's approach, however, one must back
away for an even wider view. In its substantive provisions, California
devotes separate statutory sections to each garden variety form of securities law violation. For example, separate sections make unlawful
manipulation of securities prices or trading volumes,67 material untruths or omissions,68 and trading while in possession of inside
69
information.
In the civil liability chapter, then, California devotes a separate
statutory section to civil liability for each distinct practice previous
substantive sections have made unlawful. Thus, "any person who
willfully participates" in manipulative acts or transactions is liable. 70
Under another section, any person who violates the antifraud rule
"shall be liable to the person who purchases a security from him or
sells a security to him. .. ."71 Separate civil liability provisions exist
for insider trading72 and for selling securities without a permit.73 A
newer section spells out liability of accountants, engineers, appraisers
and other experts who use their expertise or permit their name to be
used in a prospectus or offering circular. 74
Several catchall provisions exist. One section of the California civil
liability chapter is essentially a modification of Uniform Securities
65. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Hawaii has taken back some of the protection offered partners, officers and directors by holding that the term "'aided' not
only includes assisting in the inducement but rather covers any contribution to the disposition of securities." Young v. Kwock, 474 P.2d 285, 287 (Haw. 1970).
In similar fashion, Oregon's predecessor statute, repealed in 1967, required that a di-

rector, officer or agent, as well as any other collateral participant, actually participate
in a sale which violated the securities law. See, e.g., Gonia v. E. I. Hagen, 443 P.2d 634,
634 (Or. 1968) (construing then effective OR. REV. STAT. § 59.250(1)); Adamson v. Lang,

389 P.2d 39, 41 (Or. 1964).
66. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25500-25510 (West 1991).
67. See i& at § 25400.

68. Id, at § 25401.
69. Id at § 25402.
70. Id. at § 25500.

71. Id, at § 25501.
72. Id at § 25502.
73. Id. at § 25503.
74. Id

at § 25504.2 (West Supp. 1991).
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Act section 410.75 Indirectly, the statute picks up purchasers as well
as sellers.76 The section also adds the modifier "principal executive"
to "officer," and, as many other states do, 77 adds "every broker-dealer
or agent who materially aids" after the Uniform Act language pertaining to "every employee.., who materially aids." 78 The affirmative defense given these named persons is also different. The
Uniform Act language is "in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist." 79 The California defense is that the defendant had no knowledge of or "reasonable grounds to believe in the
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to
80
exist."
By a newer provision, California's statute broadens the list of persons who can be named to "any person who materially assists in any
violation of [registration or antifraud sections]."' 1 But while the statute broadens the list of potential defendants, it also increases a plaintiff's burden of proof as to these additional collateral participants.
Plaintiff must allege and prove that the other person who materially
assisted the primary violation did so "with intent to deceive or
defraud."
The California Assembly's extensive enactments in the area of defining offenses of its securities law and their labyrinth of civil liability provisions is without parallel in any other state or even the
federal scheme.8 2 For purposes of this article, however, the examination of this impressive body of law must be somewhat limited.
75. Id. at § 25504.
76. By beginning with the cross-reference: "[e]very person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under Section 25501 [antifraud section] or 25503 [sales
without a permit]," the statute incorporates the inclusion in those sections' of purchasers as well as sellers. Id.
77. See, e.g., supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text (Alaska's and Washington's
additions to the Uniform Securities Act civil liability provision).
78. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504 (West 1991).
79. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(a)(1), 7b UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 643 (1985).
80. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504 (West 1991).
81. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1 (West Supp. 1991).
82. Even among substantive provisions of the corporate law portion of the California Corporations Code exist additional liability provisions that from time to time plaintiffs utilize in securities cases. For example, Section 1507(a) of the California
Corporations Code makes officers, directors, agents or employees of a corporation liable if they "[mlake, issue, deliver or publish any prospectus, report, circular, certificate, financial statement, balance sheet . . . or participate in the making, issuance,

delivery or publication thereof .. " CAL. CORP. CODE § 1507(a) (West 1991). Further
subsections render those individuals liable for false entries in books or records or erasures or alterations of book entries. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1507 (b) & (c) (West 1991).
But the entire "cooked books" section is modified by a true scienter requirement. To
establish liability a plaintiff must prove that the officer, director or employee made or
published the false statement "with knowledge that the same is false in a material respect." Id. at § 1507(a). Liability arises only for alterations or erasures "with intent to
deceive."
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Three catchall liability provisions then are the focus. They are: (1)
the civil liability provisions for general antifraud rule violations,83
which is a combination of Federal Securities Act section 12(2) and
clause (b) of rule 10b-5; (2) the collateral participant provision
("every partner, every principal executive officer or directors");8 4 and
(3) the expanded collateral participant provision ("any person who
materially assists... with intent to deceive or defraud").85
D.

State Securities Laws General Antifraud Rules

Before a full discussion of collateral participant liability can begin,
one other item must be put on the table. Each state securities act has
a general antifraud section that tracks the SEC general antifraud
rule, rule 10b-5.86 The source of these state enactments is Uniform
Securities Act section 101.87

From North to South along the Pacific Rim, Alaska and Washington merely replicate the Uniform Securities Act provision.8 8 Oregon
substitutes a lengthy series of phrases for "in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of a security," that, among other items, deletes
the word "offer."8 9 California, as usual, requires more explanation.
The California substantive provision uses language arguably narrower than Uniform Securities Act section 101. The section invalidates offers, sales or purchases "by means of any written or oral
communication" which contains an untruth or omission relating to a
83. Id, at § 25501.
84. I. at § 25504.
85. Id. at § 25504.1 (1977 West & Supp. 1991).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
87. See, e.g., 7B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 516 (1986):
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of
any security, directly or indirectly
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
88. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.010 (1959) (substituting "a person" for "any person"); WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (1990).
89. See OR. REV. STAT. § 59.135 (1988) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security or the conduct of a securities business or for any person who receives any consideration from
another person primarily for advising the other person as to the value of securities, or
their purchase or sale, whether through the issuance of analyses or reports or
otherwise.")
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material fact,90 rather than outlawing certain acts or omissions "in
connection with" offers, sales or purchases. 91 The California antifraud rule, like Hawaii's, 92 also adds a geographic qualifier, "in this
state," as in "offer or sell a security in this state ... by means of any
93
[untrue] written or oral communication."
The companion California civil liability provision, however, goes off
in a different direction. The provision resembles Federal Securities
Act section 12 rather than grafting an express provision for civil liability onto rule 10b-5-language:
Any person who violates Section 25401 [the general antifraud section] shall be
liable to the person who purchases a security from him or sells a security to
him, who may sue either for rescission or for damages... unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff knew the facts concerning the untruth or omission or that defendant had exercised reasonable care and did not know (or if
he had exercised reasonable care would not have known) of the untruth or
omission.9 4

Finally, with the exception previously noted, Hawaii returns to
95
rule 10b-5 language, but inserts two clarifying cross-references.
Then, after replicating the three clauses of rule 10b-5, Hawaii adds its
own clauses 4 through 7. These clauses add per se violations of the
general antifraud rule. Those violations relate to untrue or misleading written prospectuses, circulars or other advertising material, failures to file the same with the commissioner, issuing such material
anonymously, and the like. 96
E. Standing, State of Mind and Other Antifraud Rule Issues
Federal SEC rule 10b-5 contains the tagline "in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security." 97 Soon after its enactment, the

courts interpreted that language as a standing requirement.98 The
Burger Court later upheld the purchaser-seller requirement after
99
To get past the federal
lower federal courts had begun to erode it.
courthouse door, no matter how outrageous a defendant's untruths or
omissions have been, the plaintiff must have purchased or sold
securities.
90. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 1991).

91. See generally C. Edward Fletcher, The "In Connection With" Requirement of
Rule 10b-5, 16 PEP. L. REV. 913 (1989).
92. Compare HAw. REV. STAT. § 485-25 (a) (1984) ("in the State") with CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25401 (West 1969) ("in this state").
93. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (West 1991).
94. Id. at § 25501 (1984).
95. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-25(a) (1984).
96. HAW. REV. STAT. § 485-25(a)(4)-(7) (1984). Subsection (b) contains a similar lit-

any of per se violations for investment advisors.
97. ITC. F.R. § 240.106-5.
98. The earliest case is Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Co., 193 F.2nd 461 (2d Cir.
1952).
99. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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Assuming the existence of a substantive violation of state securities
act antifraud provisions, 10o an issue frequently raised of late, those
state antifraud provisions would grant broader standing. Most declare unlawful certain practices "in connection with the offer, sale or
purchase of any security."101 An offeree would have standing,
although imagining what damages a mere offeree would have seems
difficult at first blush.
One such instance would be that in which the offeror's negative
misdisclosure had caused the offeree to forego a favorable investment
opportunity that other investors had then seized. 102 Another might
be the case of a takeover bid. One who had not tendered shares
would have standing to raise untruths or omissions that caused the
stampeding of fellow shareholders into the offeror's outstretched
arms.l0 3
One hypothetical illustration of the SEC rule 10b-5 purchaserseller requirement involves the broker who fails to disclose negative
news to her client. The motive might be so that the broker and her
more favored clients might be the first to sell, that is, the first to
abandon a listing ship. Even though "every hold is a buy," and the
broker's conduct is the very type securities laws should police, the
plaintiff would have no standing because, on the federal level, she
has neither bought nor sold, and under state statutes, she is neither
offeree nor seller nor purchaser 0 4
Oregon, however, remedies this problem. The Oregon antifraud
provision grants standing to those harmed by prohibited conduct
("device, scheme, artifice to defraud," or material untruths or omissions) when that conduct has occurred "in connection with ... the
conduct of a securities business,"'I 05 regardless of whether the plain100. See infra notes 182-201 and accompanying text.
101. UNIFORM SECURITIEs ACT § 101, 7B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 516 (1985) (emphasis
added).
102. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. 723, is such a case. Another is Iroquois Industries,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 990
(1970).
103. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson, Some Suggestionsfrom a Comparison of British
and American Tender Offer Regulation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 702-03 (1971) (explaining reason for "in connection with any tender offer" standing rule incorporated in
statutory antifraud rule applicable to takeover bids).
104. See, e.g., Molasky v. Garfinkle, 380 F. Supp. 549, 551-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (complaint that accountants and issuer had conspired fraudulently to induce plaintiff to retain her shares dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted).
105. OR. REV. STAT. § 59.135 (1988).

1045

tiff has bought or sold securities. The prohibition extends also to the
rendering of investment advice for consideration and for "advising
the other person as to the value of securities."106 The latter provision
could be used by a plaintiff to vindicate harms done by business brokers and similar valuation experts in a given case. Most jurisdictions,
though, have enacted only the standard Uniform Act language "in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase."o7
A generally acknowledged open question under state general antifraud statutes is the required level of fault. The issue became acute
after Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder held that any state of mind higher
than a mere lack of reasonable care was required under SEC rule
10b-5.108 State laws generally follow the language of rule 10b-5 but
they do so as statutory enactments rather than administrative rule.
On its face the rule 10b-5 language is that of strict liability. The rule,
and state general antifraud statutes, flatly make it unlawful "to make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not
misleading."i09
In Kittilson v. Ford,110 the Washington Supreme Court noted the
similarity of the language but difference in source: "[I]n contrast to
the federal scheme, the language of rule 10b-5 is not derivative but is
the statute in Washington.""' The court therefore declined to follow
Hochfelder. Under Washington's state securities law, proof of negligence is sufficient grounds for liability.
So many states, particularly those in the West, have followed this
reasoning that the state law state of mind question may no longer be
an open one.11 2 Washington courts have reiterated the Washington
Supreme Court's initial observation. 1' 3 A smattering of decisions
from other parts of the United States have reached the same conclu106. Id.
107.

7B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 516 (1985).

108. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.010 (1959); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.135 (1988); WASH
REV. CODE. § 21.20.010 (1990).

110. 608 P.2d 264 (Wash. 1980).
111. Id. at 265.
112. See, e.g., State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604, 607 (Ariz, 1980), overruling State v.
Superior Court of Maricopa County, 599 P.2d 777 (Ariz. 1979) and Greenfield v. Cheek,
593 P.2d 280; Rose v. Dobras, 624 P.2d 887, 892 (Ariz. App. 1981); Pottern v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 589 P.2d 1378, 1379 (Colo. App. 1978); State ex reL Mays v. Ridenhour,
811 P.2d 1220, 1232-33 (Kan. 1991); Fakhrdai v. Mason, 696 P.2d 1164, 1166-67 (Or. App.
1985). See also Bowden v. Robinson, 67 Cal. App. 3d 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878, 705 (1977)
(California general antifraud civil liability provision is not a strict liability provisionburden is on defendant to prove freedom from negligence).
113. See, e.g., Golberg v. Sanglier, 616 P.2d 1239, 1248 (Wash. App. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 639 P.2d 1347 (Wash. 1981), modTfied, 647 P.2d 489 (Wash. 1982); Aspeland v. Olerich, 784 P.2d 179, 182 (Wash. App. 1990).
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sion.114 Under state securities laws' general antifraud statutes, allegation and proof of mere negligence is the general state of mind
requirement. That lower requirement seems a big advantage for
plaintiffs, because the federal standard is higher and because state of
mind, or fault, quickly becomes the focal point in securities law cases,
particularly those in which plaintiff seeks recovery from collateral
participants in the transaction. 115
III.
A.

THE OPEN QUESTIONS FOR COLLATERAL PARTICIPANTS AND
COURTS UNDER STATE SECURITIES LAWS

Preview

The thorny questions that practitioners ask begin with the state securities acts' civil liability provisions. The first is, can plaintiffs expand the term seller, as in Uniform Securities Act section 410(a), to
include within its ambit collateral participants other than those
named by Uniform Securities Act section 410(b) and its progeny? If
plaintiffs can do so, what is the test of expanded seller status? Beyond strict privity, in the sense of passing title, is the proper state law
test of expanded seller status a broader, but still limited, transactional privity? Or is it a solicitation, point of sale analysis similar to
that the Supreme Court adopted in Pinter v. Dahl? Or is a broader
still substantial factor, substantial contributive factor, or proximate
cause test that various of the federal circuits, and a few state courts,
attempted to articulate before Pinter v. Dahl a more appropriate test
of expanded seller status under state law?
What is the standard for liability of collateral participants in states
such as Oregon or Arizona which impose liability upon "every person

who participates or materially aids" in the

sale?116

What prevents

routine rendition of professional services from resulting in liability?
Do the lines courts draw under those statutes offer any guidance for
courts called upon to expand seller status under the Uniform Securities Act civil liability provision?
Moving to state law general antifraud statutes, the first question is
whether an implied private right of action exists for their violation,
114. See, e.g., Crook v. Shearson Loeb Rhodes, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 40, 49 (N.D. Ind.
1983); State v. Temby, 322 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Wis. App. 1982).
115. But see infra note 211 and preceding text (explaining the conclusion that an
across-the-board negligence floor may turn out to be disadvantageous for plaintiffs).
116. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3)
(1988).
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independent of the civil liability provision? Expressed another way,
is the civil liability provision of the state securities act exclusive? If a
private right of action exists, does that right include within its reach
implied secondary liability for those who assist or otherwise become
involved in the primary violator's wrongdoing? Is the test of such
secondary liability aiding and abetting? If aiding and abetting is a legitimate allegation under state antifraud statutes, is the state of mind
requirement the same as, or is it higher, than that required to be
proven against a primary violator? These and other intractable subjects are the topics to which this more analytical section of the article
addresses itself.
B.

Expanded Seller Status

In 1987, in Haberman v. WPSS, 117 when the Supreme Court of
Washington first addressed itself to the question, Justice
Brachtenbach could find only two other state law decisions that had
addressed the issue. One had refused to adopt broadened seller status under the Uniform Securities Act civil liability provision. 18 The
other had followed federal decisions, adhering to a substantial factor
test of expanded seller status under a Uniform Securities Act 410
based provision."19 The Supreme Court of Washington adopted the
latter course, holding that a collateral participant could be held as a
seller "if his acts were a substantial contributive factor in the sales
transaction,12o and raising the number of state court decisions on
the issue to three.
Since that time, and reflecting the rapid emergence of state law,
there have been a number of decisions,121 including at least four by
the Washington Supreme Court alone.122 The vast majority of these
decisions adopt and apply tests of expanded seller status. The principal debate is the contour of the test of expanded seller status. At
least the latter is true if one analyzes the issue state by state rather
than by sheer number of opinions. The statement made must be
qualified in this way because the number of California decisions rivals reported cases in all other jurisdictions combined. And the California decisions require strict privity.123
117. 744 P.2d 1032, 1050 (Wash. 1987) modified in part, 750 P.2d 254 (Wash. 1988).
118. Nikkel v. Stifel, 542 P.2d 1305, 1307 (Okla. 1975).
119. Anders v. Dakota Land & Develop. Co., 380 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Minn. App. 1986).
120. Haberman, 744 P.2d at 1051.
121. See infra note 133 for decisions from other states.
122. Hoffer v. State, 755 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1988) (Hoffer I); Hoffer v. State, 113
N.W.2d 148 (Wash. 1989) (Hoffer II); Hines v. Data Line Systems, 787 P.2d 8 (Wash.
1990); Schmidt v. Cornerstone Investments, 795 P.2d 1143 (Wash. 1990).
123. See, e.g., Victor v. White, BLUE SKY L. REP. 73,015, at 74,046 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
("strict privity" is required; cannot "honestly be contended" that indenture trustee was
a seller of municipal bonds under s. 25501); In re ZZZZ Best Securities Litigation,
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Alternatively, California cases hold that to be held under the
state's antifraud rule a defendant must actually have been a "literal
seller."124 The latter phrasing arguably would expand the defendant
class beyond those who pass title in the legal sense, but not by
much.125 Last of all, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a California antifraud rule plaintiff must be a direct purchaser. Even if
they are able to prove both reliance and loss causation, aftermarket
and other purchasers from third parties cannot hold a defendant for
126
misrepresentations because they did not purchase from him.
The California position is anomalous but understandable. On its
face, the California general antifraud provision seems to be a generous no fault scheme. The general antifraud provision combines the
language of Federal Securities Act section 12(2), making unlawful offers or sales "by means of any written or oral communication which
includes an untrue statement of a material fact," with clause (b) of
Federal rule iOb-5.127 Neither component mentions fault or state of
mind. Only the companion civil liability provision prevents a strict
73,015 at 73,833, 838-39 & 847-48 (C.D. Cal. 1989) ("Only actual sellers, i.e., the transferers of title, can be liable under § 25501"; the court therefore dismissed claims against market maker, certain underwriters and accounting firm.);
Lubin v. Sybedon Corporation, 688 F. Supp. 1425, 1453 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (privity required; Section 25501 and 25504 claims against law firm and others were dismissed); In
re National Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool, 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
("Liability is limited to actual sellers"; the claims against a lawyer and his large Chicago law firm were dismissed); In re Diasonics Securities Litigation, 599 F. Supp. 447,
458-59 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (Section 25501 claims against officers, directors and co-lead underwriters were dismissed). But see Commins v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) $ 72,921, at 73,544 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (liability under 25501 'extends no further than liability under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act," nonetheless it dismissed claims
against oil drilling venture's insurer); In re Activision Securities Litigation, 621 F.
Supp. 415, 427 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding sections 25401 and 25501 "together are similar
to § 12(2) and require that Plaintiffs allege seller or 'substantial factor' status.").
124. The phrasing comes from the leading case of Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677
F.2d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1982) (attorney who had assisted sale of unregistered stock
could be a seller for section 12(2) purposes but could not be held under California antifraud rule which would require that he be a "literal seller").
125. Some California decisions make clear that transactional privity is what they
require. See, e.g., Commins v. Johnson & Higgins, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) § 72,921, at
73,537 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (attorney who drafted a telephone sales compliance manual and
spoke with potential investors held liable). Many others speak in terms of "strict privity" and intimate that nothing less than passing title will suffice. See, e.g., supra note
114.
126. See, e.g., Griffin v. Rontek Corp., BLUE SKY L. REP. 72,960 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(Section 25501 claims were dismissed as to aftermarket purchasers of debentures).
127. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401 (1991) ("or omits to state a material fact necessary in
order to made the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading.").
BLUE SKY L. REP.
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liability scheme from emerging, providing that a defendant can prove
that the plaintiff knew of the untruth or "that the defendant exercised reasonable care and did not know . . . of the untruth or
8
omission."12
Yet access to this generous scheme for plaintiffs is extremely narrow, confined to first tier purchasers who were in strict privity with
those named as defendants. Courts guard this route because, in more
deliberate fashion than does any other jurisdiction, California describes other routes to be followed for reaching other defendant
classes. As has been seen, 129 one provision names categories of collateral participants (partners, officers, directors, brokers, employees
who materially assist). 130 Beyond named categories, another provision provides that still other defendants can be reached but the state
of mind requirement scales upward to "intent to deceive or defraud."13l Still another liability provision governs expert collateral
participants who have consented to be named in offering
documents.132
California's scheme is thus a legislative version of sliding scale
analysis that at least two federal circuits have evolved as a matter of
128. Id. at § 25501.
129. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
130. But the California federal courts have held that strict privity limitation applies
to section 25504 as well. Thus, a plaintiff must have been a direct purchaser from the
issuer with whom the defendant is affiliated as control person, partner, officer, director, employee or broker-dealer. See, e.g., In re ZZZZ Best, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
72,890, at 73838 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (ZZZZ Best I) ("Under section 25504, strict privity is
still required."); Lubin v. Sybedon, 688 F.Supp. 1425, 1453 (S.D. Cal. 1987) ("Because
the causes of action provided for in sections 25501, 25504, 25504.1 and 25504.2 are by
their terms derived from section 25401, a failure to show direct privity will defeat
those derivative claims."); In re Diasonics 599 F. Supp. 447, 459, (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("Section 25504, by its terms, applies to violations of section 25501). Hence strict privity is
still proper under the wording of section 25540 but not as to sections 25504.1 and
25504.2. For example, section 25504.1 holds '[a]ny person who materially assists in any
violation" of registration or antifraud provisions "jointly and severally liable with any
other person liable.., for such violation." Accord In re ZZZZ Best BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) 73,277, at 7,4,720 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (ZZZZ Best II) ("Greenberg's argument that
'strict privity' between the defendant and plaintiff is required under section 25504.1 is
without merit. From a plain reading of the statute, liability is placed upon 'any person
who materially assists in any violation of Section ... 24401.' Liability under this section
is not dependent upon the alleged relationship with the vendor or purchaser.").
131. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1 (West Supp. 1992). This state of mind requirement
has been interpreted to impose a requirement much stricter than a federal securities
law aiding and abetting construct. Orloff v. AIlman, 819 F.2d 904, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1987)
(requirements for pleading aiding and abetting under California law are "much
stricter" than under federal law). See also ZZZZ Best II, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
73,277, at 74,717 (dismissing aiding and abetting allegations against New York law firm
of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed that allege only recklessness and, for purposes of California law, refusing to equate, for some purposes, reckless with intentional conduct, as
federal courts have done in federal securities law cases).
132. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.2 (West Supp. 1991).
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common law.133 That is, as a defendant, or the class of which he is a
part, is or is likely to be further removed from the core of a transaction, the state of mind and perhaps other elements of a cause of action scale upward.134 But, contrary to first impressions, rather than
being a generous no fault scheme, from plaintiffs' perspective, California's extensive enactments are among the least generous. The requirement of strict privity and the high state of mind required to
reach many typical collateral participants make plaintiffs' chances
for recovery slim to none.
Returning to other jurisdictions and the Uniform Securities Act,
the arguments for or against expansion of the term seller are several.
First, along with its state-by-state counterparts, Uniform Securities
Act section 410 contains a list of collateral participants who the legislature believes should be held responsible ("every partner, officer, director," etc.). Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
3
alterius,1
5 the naming of some excludes the others not named.
In Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply System,i 36 the
Washington Supreme Court rejected such analysis, reasoning that
[R]espondents' argument that a substantial contributive factor approach to
seller in [Uniform Securities Act section 410(a)] would render [section 410(b)'s
listing of categories of defendants] meaningless is without merit. Although
some secondarily liable parties under [subsection (b)] may also be liable as
sellers under Isubsection (a)], clearly not all secondarily liable parties are sellers under the substantial contributive factor test. Thus, as contemplated by
the statutory scheme, participants who are involved in a securities sale, but
who are not substantial contributive factors [such as partners, officers
or di1 37
rectors], may be subject to secondary liability under [subsection (b)].

Many state statutes also provide that they are to be construed consistently with federal law.138 In Dahl, the Supreme Court either
133. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 2, at 350-55 (description of sliding scale analysis
in Second and Ninth Circuits). See generally Douglas Branson, Statutory Securities
Fraud in the Post-HochfelderEra; The Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysis, 52 TULANE L. REV. 50 (1977).
134. Of course, from a plaintiff's viewpoint, a principle difficulty with 'the California scheme is that the state of mind requirement is too high. To state a case against
other collateral participants, a plaintiff will plead and prove herself into malpractice
policies' intentional misconduct exclusions, increasing chances for winning the legal
case but lessening chances for actual recovery. See supra note 42.
135. Expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.
136. 744 P.2d 1032, 1052 (Wash. 1987).
137. Id.
138. Uniform Securities Act § 415 7B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 678 (Amended 1985)
provides: "This act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation and
administration of this act with the related federal regulation." See also ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-2001 (1987) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.900 (1989) (same).
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eliminated broadened seller status altogether or retained it only in
narrow fashion.139 The Supreme Court of Washington has read Dahl
as having done the former, adopting "a strict privity analysis of the

term 'seller.'

"140

That is a misreading of Dahl. By reading the Securities Act's broad
definitions of "sell" and "offer to sell" into the liability section, the
Supreme Court adopted a broad transactional privity rather than a
strict "passing title" test that may be seen as a broadened seller construct, albeit one on the narrower part of the broadened seller
141
spectrum.
Moreover, when asked to reconsider an earlier ruling in light of
Dahl, the Supreme Court of Washington noted that "the Supreme
Court's construction of a similarly worded federal statute, although
often persuasive, 'is not controlling in our interpretation of a state
statute.' "142 For a number of reasons, 143 the court decided to retain
broadened seller liability and the substantial factor test of that status
which the Supreme Court had rejected in Dahl. Other state courts
have split on the issue, with intermediate appellate courts applying
Dahl and at least two state supreme courts opting for retention of a
broader test of seller status.'"
While state courts have split on the issue of what test to apply,
But see Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264, 265 (Wash. 1980) (provision does not require
"imitation" of the federal scheme's administration). Alaska, Hawaii and Oregon did
not adopt Uniform Securities Act section 415.
139. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1988).
140. See, e.g., Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 964 (Wash. 1989). See also Hines v. Data
Line Systems, Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 20 & n. 8 (Wash. 1990) (reaffirming holding in Hoffer).
141. See, e.g., 486 U.S. at 642-43:
In common parlance, a person may offer or sell property without necessarily
being the person who transfers title to, or other interest in, that property. We
need not rely entirely on ordinary understanding of the statutory language,
however . . . Section 2(3) defines "sale" or "sell" [broadly] . . . Under these

definitions, the range of persons potentially liable under § 12(1) is not limited
to persons who pass title.
Id.

142. Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 964 (1989).
143. Hoffer's reasoning included a conclusion that the Washington statute is to be
more broadly construed than the federal statute and differences in structure of the
two statutes. Id. at 965.
144. See, e.g., Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 544 A.2d 878, 882 (N.J. App. 1988)
(adopting the Dahl sale-solicitation as test of expanded seller status under New Jersey
Securities Act); State v. Williams, 390 S.E.2d 746, 749 (N.C. App. 1990) (applies Dahl to
reverse attorney's criminal conviction); Allen v. Columbia Financial Mgmt. Ltd., 377
S.E.2d 352, 356 (S.C. App. 1988) (applies Dahl v. Pinter as test of seller status under
South Carolina law). Accord Abell v. Potomac Insurance, 858 F.2d 1104, 1115 (5th Cir.
1988) (applying Dahl as test of broadened seller status under Louisiana law); Capri v.
Murphy, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 72,901 (2nd Cir. 1988) (Connecticut law). But see
State ex rel. Mays v. Ridenhour, 811 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Kan. 1991) ("the basic framework
in which the [state and federal] statues are formulated shows a different approach
should be employed"); State v. Hoffer, 776 P.2d 963, 964, applying Haberman v. WPSS,
744 P.2d 1032, 1051-52 (1987).
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they have not differed on the underlying principle. That is, they argue that the term "seller" encompasses more than just the actual
seller. Although often unarticulated, their reasons are several. One
reason is that they view state securities acts both as remedial legislation, to be broadly construed, and as a gap filling device, to fill the
interstices left blank by federal securities laws and decisions.
In adopting a broader test of seller status, the Supreme Court of
Washington found it "important to note that the [Washington State
Securities Act] has a different purpose than the federal statute, in
that it endeavors to protect investors, not just the integrity of the
marketplace. Accordingly, our statute is more broadly construed."' 145
Stating that the federal securities acts do not have protection of investors at their core, when federal statutes are replete with the language "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors,"146 seems incongruous at the least. What is
noteworthy is the judicial feeling itself that state securities acts have
a broader and somewhat different purpose than does the federal
scheme.
Another reason for states' continuing broad interpretation of seller
may be the legislative reenactment doctrine, or some version of it.
On at least two occasions, in connection with securities law issues,
the United States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine to uphold
implied causes of action. 147 If Congress has enacted substantial
amendments to a statutory framework under which substantial numbers of judicial decisions have been implying a private cause of action,
and the legislative package leaves undisturbed the provision under
which the cause of action has been implied, the court will read the
latter bit of nonaction as tantamount to legislative reenactment of
the well-recognized implied cause of action.
Arguably, under the Uniform Securities Act legislative renactment
145. Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 965 (1989) (Hoffer II), relying on Haberman, 744
P.2d at 1049.
146. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 3b, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (Commission can add
class of securities to those exempted if "enforcement of this title... is not necessary in
the public interest or for the protection of investors"); Securities Act of 1933 § 2c, 15
U.S.C. § 77c(c) (can exempt small business investment company securities if not necessary "in the public interest and for the protection of investors"). At any time Congress
delegated authority to the commission to exempt transactions or to implement a provision, and at many other points, the unvarying statutory standard is "in the public interest and for the protection of investors." Id (citations omitted).
147. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, .386-87 (1983) (Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5); Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82
(1982) (Commodity Exchange Act).
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has taken place on two levels. First, periodically, state legislatures
have substantially amended state securities acts while leaving undisturbed the provision under which courts have been reading seller
broadly.148 Secondly, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
have revised and restated the Uniform Securities Act while leaving
undisturbed the portion of it under which courts have expanded
seller.149 Stronger still, in commentary the Commissioners seemingly endorse the practice of courts:
[The section] follows closely Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 which
imposes liability for material misstatements or omissions in the disclosures
given to buyers. As is the case with the latter, liability may be imposed on a
person in addition to the immediate seller if the person's participation was a
substantial contributive factor in the violation. 15 °

The Justices of the Washington Supreme Court felt that a legislative
renactment had taken place. That court cited the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws' 1985 commentary in support of their decision
not to follow Dahl and to retain broadened seller status under Washington's version of the Uniform Securities Act. 151
Uniform Securities Act section 410(b) would also hold liable "any
employee of such seller who materially aids in the sale."152 Some
states have broadened the list by adding "agent" to employee. 153
Plaintiffs have had some success in pursuing collateral participants
under section 410(b) or their state's equivalent and broadened readings of employee rather than under section 410(a) and broadened
seller status. In limited fashion, too, plaintiffs might attempt expansion of the categories of officers and directors that Uniform Securities Act section 410 names to include de facto officersl54 or those who
function as "shadow directors."15
In Ackerman, Jablonski,Porterfield & De Ture v. Alhadeff,156 federal district Judge Voorhees denied the national accounting firm Arthur Andersen's motion to dismiss. As to a failed oil and gas
exploration program, the judge held that "[u]nder these allegations
148. Cf. Hawaii's amendment of the civil liability provision itself requiring that
partners, officers and directors are liable only if they "materially aid" the transaction,
supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
149. See COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS-PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL
MEETING at § 605 & Comment 1, at 463 (1985) ('The section has been rewritten... but
is not intended to alter significantly existing law.").
150. Id., Comment 2, at 464.
151. Haberman v. WPSS, 744 P.2d 1032, 1051 (1987).
152. See 7B UNIFORM LAwS ANN. 643 (1985).
153. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 485-20 (West Supp. 1991) (every director, officer or
agent of or for the seller, if the director, officer or agent has personally participated or
aided in any way in making the sale).
154. Possibly in anticipation of such an attempt, the California statute adds the
qualifier "principal executive" to officers. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.
155. The term is British, legislatively introduced to company law, which includes
securities law, by Companies Act 1980, § 63(1).
156. FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,756 at 93,685 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
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Andersen could be considered an employee of the seller of the securities who materially aided the sales transaction." 15 7 An Alaska court
has refused to permit an attorney out from under allegations that he
could be held liable as an employee under Alaska's version of Uniform Securities Act section 410(b).158 An older Hawaiian decision
adopts a broad view of agents' liability under the Hawaii Securities
Act.15 9

By contrast, several courts have applied the Uniform Securities Act
definition of agent as limited to one who "represents a broker/dealer
or issuer in effecting or attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities," declining to hold liable attorneys or accountants as agents
of the seller.16o
C.

Tests of Expanded Seller Status

Certain jurisdictions such as Arizona and Oregon do not need tests
of expanded seller. Those jurisdictions have statutes that hold liable
"every person who participates or materially aids in the sale" that violated their state's securities laws.161 In

a direct manner, they hold

liable those who might be reached in other jurisdictions through ex157. Id. (citing Washington's version of Uniform Securities Act § 410(b)).
158. See Pottle v. Coffey, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) $ 73,226, at 74,449-50 (Alaska
Sup. Ct. 1990) (denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to attorney's liability). Cf. Allen v. Columbia Financial Mgmt., 377 S.E.2d 352, 356-57 (S.C. App. 1988)
(attorneys could not be deemed employees).
159. See Young v. Kwock, 474 P.2d 285, 287 (Haw. 1970):
[A] corporation, bereft of both body and mind, can only perate trough
agents, and it, is the agents who knowingly aid the illegal transaction that are
jointly and severally liable.
...[Defendant corporate agent] argues that "aids" means inducing the purchaser to buy and that the facts indicate that she took no part in the "selling"
effort. Though some jurisdictions have followed such reasoning.... Therefore, not merely the salesman who induced the purchase but all officers, directors and agents who in any way contributed to the disposition of the
securities are liable.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
160. Uniform Securities Act § 401(b). The definition of agent has been used to limit
categories of persons liable in, inter alia, Ackerman v. Schwartz, 733 F. Supp. 1231
(N.D. Ind. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (attorney who
wrote opinion letter is not an agent for purposes of Indiana securities law); Jensen v.
Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d 720, 729 (Minn. 1983) (accounting firm did not represent issuer in any transaction "nor did it effect or attempt to effect any sales"); Rendler v. Markos, 453 N.W.2d 202 (Wisc. App. 1990) ("The definition of agent does not
include attorneys who merely render legal advice or draft documents for use in securities transactions.").
161. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2003 (1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3)
(1988).
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panded seller status.162 At the opposite end of the spectrum is California. Holding to strict privity under its general antifraud rule, and
admitting liability for other participants only under a statutory "intent to deceive or defraud" standard,16 3 California also has no motivation to expand or otherwise modify the term "seller" as used in the
California Securities Law of 1968.
The remaining Pacific Rim jurisdictions are between those poles
but only one, Washington, has any significant case law. 164 Washington has borrowed from the federal circuit courts of appeal to fashion
its test of who expanded sellers might be. Although commentators
purport to discern no less than four different federal court tests of
expanded seller status, 165 Washington has seized upon the federal
test with by far the most, and some would say the only,166 currency.
That test is the proximate cause/substantial factor test appellate
panels in the Fifth Circuit developed,167 to be followed by several
other circuits, including the Ninth.168
A principal criticism of the test as applied by federal circuits is
that, although those courts mouth proximate cause as the test of expanded seller, they utilize the tort law substantial factor analysis of
cause in fact. True proximate cause analysis is a further winnowing,
based upon factors such as forseeability, a cost-benefit analysis of the
harm to be avoided versus the costs of precautionary measures, and
other policy factors.
Unlike federal courts of appeal, the Washington Court at least has
consulted the Restatement (Second) of Torts on the subject of proximate cause:
[We hold that a defendant is liable as a seller under RCW 21.20.430(1) [Uniform Securities Act section 410(a)] if his acts were a substantial contributive
factor in the sales transaction. Considerations important in determining
whether a defendant's conduct is a substantial contributive factor in the sales
162. See also In re Gas Reclamation, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying
similar but somewhat modified Texas statute to hold potentially liable surety);
Perkowski v. Megas Corp., 563 N.E.2d 378 (Ohio App. 1990) (radio talk show host held
liable under similar statute despite exclusion for gratuitous investment advice).
163. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1 (West Supp. 1991).
164. But see the discussion of Young v. Kwock, 474 P.2d 285, 287 (Haw. 1970), supra
note 147 ("all officers, directors and agents who in any way contributed to the disposition of the securities are liable") (emphasis in original).
165. See, e.g., Joseph E. Reece, Would Someone Please Tell Me the Definition of the
Term "Seller": The Confusion Surrounding Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933,
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 35, 42 (1989) (proximate cause/substantial factor, unique position,
solicitation, and participation tests discerned in various circuits).
166. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 2, at 337 ("nonexistent" participation test of expanded seller status has been "more of a topic for commentary than anything else").
167. See, e.g., Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981); Croy v. Campbell, 624
F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617 (5th Cir. 1973); Hill York
Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971).
168. SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 650 (9th Cir. 1980), and Anderson v. Aurotek,
774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985), are the leading cases.
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transaction include: (1) the number of other factors which contribute to the
sale and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (2) whether
the defendant's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in
continuous and active operation up to the time of the sale, or has created a
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not
responsible; and (3) lapse of time. Whether a defendant's conduct
was a sub16 9
stantial contributive factor is necessarily a question of fact.
Defense attorneys argue that this test is nothing more than a version
of the Pinter v. Dahl point of sale solicitation test.

The Washington courts do regard participation in the sales effort as
a clincher. Or, more accurately, the lack of any personal involvement
by defendant with plaintiff or others of her class is regarded as
highly persuasive.170 Nonetheless, the lack of personal involvement
is not dispositive.

The other ammunition for defense attorneys is the Washington
Court's enunciation of the test as "substantial contributive factor in
the sales transaction." That language is fodder for argument that the
state law test of expanded seller status is no broader than the federal
test the Supreme Court devised in Pinterv. Dahl. That the Supreme
Court of Washington pointedly refused to follow Pinter v. Dahl

aside, 171 the Washington Court uses varying phraseology. Broader
possibly than sales transaction, the Washington justices have referred
to substantial factor "in causing the sale to take place."' 72 They have
also referred to "substantial contributive factor in the sales process"'1 73 and to "substantial factor in the violation"17 4 or in the acts
constituting the violation:
Proximate cause properly applied, or in the form of a substantial factor test,
needs a qualifier. A court may ask if the collateral participant was a substan169. Haberman v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1052 (1987) (citing
§§ 432, 433 (1977)).
170. See Schmidt v. Cornerstone Inv., 795 P.2d 1143, 1151 (Wash. 1990), involving
loans brokers' use of an inflated appraisal of the "Bargain Boys" commercial property
to obtain funds. Of the corporate alter ego, Brink, the court found "no evidence ...
which showed Brink had any contact with the appraisers, or that he was involved in
marketing Bargain Boys or in soliciting plaintiffs to make the investment. In fact, the
evidence showed Brink met plaintiffs for the first time many months after they made
their initial investment." Id.
Of the attorney, the court noted that "[t]he record indicates no evidence was
presented at trial which showed Austin had contact with plaintiffs regarding the investment, nor was there evidence that Austin had any involvement in negotiations...
during the search for an investor." Id. at 1151-52.
171. See Hoffer v. State, 776 P.2d 963, 964-65 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (Hoffer II).
172. See Hoffer v. State, 755 P.2d 781, 789-90 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (Hoffer I).
173. Hines v. Data Line Sys. Inc., 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990) (en banc).
174. Habermam v. WPSS, 744 P.2d 1032, 1051 (Wash. 1987) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 805
(1988).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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tial factor in the sale or selling effort, a substantial factor in producing the
harm which has befallen the plaintiff, or a substantial factor in the transaction ...
(C]ourts do seem to be asking merely if defendants were substantial
factors in the transaction. It is, however, difficult to tell. Many
[federal]
175
courts which use substantial factor fail to add any qualifier at all.

The Washington court's problem, of course, has not been lack of a
qualifier but inconsistent use of several qualifiers. Be that as it may,
defense attorneys' seizure of "substantial contributive factor in the
sales transaction" is only part of the story. The Washington Supreme
Court has chosen a test of expanded seller status broader than the
Dahl solicitation test that, based upon language such as substantial
factor in the sales process or in the violation, could be fully as broad
as the pre-Dahl federal court decisions, or nearly so.
Other than such a statement, the only other guidance as to how
far-reaching broadened seller status might be would involve a highly
fact sensitive case-by-case analysis. At least the beginnings for such
an analysis post-Pinterv. Dahl already exist in the Washington case
law.
In Hines v. Data Line Sys., Inc.,176 the Washington Supreme Court
affirmed a summary judgement in favor of the state's largest law
firM.'177 The court agreed that to hold attorneys liable, "'something
more' must be shown than performance of the usual drafting and filing services provided by counsel."'178 That something more could be
involvement in the solicitation process. Alternatively, something
more could be the rendering of legal advice if the advice had been "a
catalyst in the sales transaction."' 179 The law firm's advice that a
principal corporate officer's illness had been rendered immaterial by
80
superseding events did not rise to that level.
By contrast, in Hoffer v. State,'8 ' the court found potentially liable
another collateral participant who had no face-to-face dealings with
investors.' 8 2 The defendant state auditor had, however, provided a
comfort letter for the public power agency to include in its annual reports that could have lead investors to believe that the auditor was an
alert watchdog. Likewise, in Haberman v. WPSS, 1 8 3 the court faced
claims against members of a public power consortium, participants in
its nuclear power plant construction projects, and the professionals
who rendered services to the consortium, including accountants, con175. Branson, supra note 2, at 357.
176. 787 P.2d 8, 20 (Wash. 1990).
177. Id, at 21.
178. Id. at 20.
179. Id,
180. Id.
181. 755 P.2d 781 (Wash. 1988) (en banc), affd upon reconsideration in light of
Dahl v. Pinter, 776 P.2d 963 (Wash. 1989).
182. Id, at 785-87.
183. 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987).
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sulting engineers and lawyers. After adopting a "substantial contributive factor" test of expanded seller status, the court remanded the
case to the trial court for determination as to which of these parties
defendants, most of whom had no face-to-face or other direct dealings
with investors, might be sellers under the enunciated test. 8 4 On
analysis of the facts of Washington cases, and the status of various
defendants in them, it becomes clear that to be held liable a defendant need not have participated in the solicitation or sales process directly or have had face-to-face or other dealings with investors in
order to be held to have been a "substantial contributive factor."
D.

The Dividing Line Between Rendition of Routine Professional
Service and Liability-CreatingActivity

Until recently at least, Oregon judges reiterated that, without
more, rendition of routine professional services could not make liable
collateral participants. Thus, the Oregon judges reached a conclusion
identical to that reached by their brethren in states with broadened
seller status and substantial factor tests. 8 5 In several cases, however,
Oregon courts have found the "something more," resulting in
liability.
At the top of one branch of cases is Adams v. American Western
Sec.' 8 6 There, an attorney confronted the not uncommon situation in
which the client issuer has pre-offered or sold the securities about
which the issuer belatedly seeks legal advice. The normal prescription is first to work a rescission of any illegal offers or sales that have
184. Haberman, of course, is pre-Pinter v. Dahl. But of similar ilk post-Pinter v.
Dahl is the application of the Haberman test by a federal judge in In re Wash. Public
Power Supply Sys. Securities Litigation, FED. SEC. REG. REP. (CCH) § 72,961, at 73,739-

41 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (financial advisor, consulting engineer and member participants
could be sellers and at least a jury question presented as to forecast data that was disclosed" in offering documents could be sellers).
185. Compare Gonia v. Estep, 446 P.2d 114 (Or. 1968) (dismissal of attorney upheld
under predecessor statute) with Hines v. Data Line Systems, 787 P.2d 8 (Wash. 1990)
("something more' must be shown than performance of the usual drafting and filing

services provided by counsel.") Id at 20. See also Allison v. Southampton Music Co.,
[1986-87 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
72,440, at 72,069 (D. Or. 1986)
(attorney in master recording tax shelter scheme did no more than "render legal serv-

ices normally performed by lawyers for their clients" and could not be held under Oregon statute); Austin v. Bear, Marks & Upham, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] BLUE SKY L.
REP. (CCH) 72,437 (D. Or. July 18, 1986) (summary judgement for lawyers who did
nothing more than procure Oregon consent to process forms and review oil and gas
limited partnership certificate for validity under local law).

186. 510 P.2d 838 (Or. 1973).
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taken place.18 7 Attorney Joachims, however, proceeded to take steps
for registration or perfection of a limited offering exempt transaction
under Oregon law. He was held liable as one who participates or materially aided the illegal sale. The Oregon Supreme Court held
that when an attorney prepares, attends to the execution of, and personally
delivers and files documents required for the registration of a security with
the knowledge that solicitation and sales of such a security have already been
made, such conduct goes beyond what plaintiff describes as the 'preparation of
documents and other services normally performed by a lawyer for a
client'... 188

The case seems a classic instance of the "blind eye" phenomenon in
which the collateral participant renders only routine services but
does so while knowing that a violation of law has occurred or is about
to occur.

189

The other principal branch of cases in which Oregon courts have
held seemingly routine services to be something more are cases in
which the collateral participant has helped the primary wrongdoer
create or maintain a false appearance. In Fakhrdai v. Mason,190 for
example, the defendant attorney drafted documents for the purchase
of a car dealership. The documents recited an inflated purchase price
and downpayment, so that a third party who later purchased a onehalf interest would unknowingly be funding the entire down
payment.19 1
192
Another Oregon "false appearance" case is Adamson v. Lang.

The defendant collateral participant there lent funds to an issuer so
that the issuer could break escrow under a common type arrangement imposed by state securities regulators. Lifting the sales restriction created the false appearance that the offering had been more
successful than was the case. Defendant lender was held liable as
one who had participated in or materially aided the illegal sale of
securities.

193

These two branches of material assistance cases, blind eye and false
appearance cases, contain a strong inference, or more, of knowledge.
187. See generally Alan A. Bromberg, Curing Securities Violations: Recession Offers and Other Techniques, 1 J. CoRp. L. 1 (1975).
188. Adams, 510 P. 2d at 844 (quoting Gonia v. Estep, 446 P.2d 114 (Or. 1968)).
189. See also Ahern v. Gaussoin, 611 F. Supp. 1465, 1491 (D. Or. 1985). In Ahern,
which involved a large prominent Portland, Oregon client corporation, the Registration statement, as well as other documents, were alleged to have contained numerous
misrepresentations. The law firm partner and law firm were held in the case on the
basis of American West: "It [American West] stands for the proposition that certain
routine professional services, coupled with knowledge of violations of the Oregon securities laws by the seller, may give rise to liability." Defendant attorneys' motions for
summary judgement were denied. Id.
190. 696 P.2d 1164 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).
191. Id. at 1167.
192. 389 P.2d 39 (Or. 1964).
193. Id. at 92. The Oregon court relied on a Kansas case holding liable an individual who had allowed himself to be named a dummy director of an issuer. His presence
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The collateral participant rendered only what seem to be routine
services but the conclusion that they knew, or must have known, of
the primary -violator's wrongdoing is inescapable. Even though the
Oregon courts do not always articulate their belief that knowledge
was present, as they did do in American Western, a strong judicial
belief in knowledge's presence is evident from the opinions, at least
until Justice :Hans Linde and Prince v. Brydon.194
In Prince,an Idaho attorney had prepared documents, including an
offering circular, for a mining partnership. He knew that one partner intended to sell units in Oregon but the record did not establish
whether he had advised on Oregon Securities Act requirements.
Nonetheless, the record contained no evidence of the type of knowledge present in the blind eye and false appearance cases in which
other collateral participants had been held liable in Oregon. Disagreeing with the court of appeals, Justice Linde held that there
need not be.
Reading the statute literally, Justice Linde reasoned:
Whether one's assistance in the sale is "material" does not depend upon one's
knowledge of the facts that make it unlawful; it depends on the importance of
one's personal contribution to the transaction. Typing, reproducing, and delivering sales documents may all be essential to a sale, but they could be performed by anyone; it is a drafter's knowledge, judgement, and assertions
1 95
reflected in the contents of the documents that are "material" to the sale.

Thus, the dividing line had become not knowledge or a strong inference of knowledge but ministerial or scrivener's acts versus more
substantial functions.
The defendant can exonerate herself by proof that, in the exercise
of reasonable care, she could not have know "of the existence of the
facts on which the liability is based." 196 But even there Justice Linde
offered scant consolation:
The drafters took pains to make clear that the relevant knowledge is of "the
existence of the facts," not of the unlawfulness of a sale. These provisions
may place upon persons ...who materially aid in an unlawful sale of securion the issuer's board had created a false appearance that facilitated sale of shares. See
Mosley v. Unruh, P.2d 537 (Kan. 1939).
More routine creations of false appearances are those in which broker-dealers or issuers promulgate inflated sales or profit figures. See, e.g., Green v. Jonhop Inc., 358 F.
Supp. 413 (D. Or. 1973) (issuer, corporate officer, and broker dealer firm found liable
under the Oregon type statute, as a person who participates or materially assists). See
also Gonia v. E.I. Hagen Co., 443 P.2d 634 (Or. 1968) (where the court held liable the
defendant who had accompanied securities salesperson calling on prospective
customers).
194. 764 P.2d 1370 (Or. 1988).
195. Id. at 1371.
196. OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(3) (1987).
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ties a substantial burden to exonerate themselves . . . but this legislative
choice was deliberate .... The defense against strict liability, in short, was to
be a showing of ignorance, not the professional role of the person who renders
material aid in the unlawful sale. 1 9 7

The standard defense tactic, to show that the defendant collateral
participant is a professional who rendered only standard or routine
services, will no longer work in Oregon.
Justice Linde's close reading of the statute is no doubt accurate.
But it evinces none of the tempering gloss that wise judicial interpretation may dictate. Also, his decision, and the "hubbub" surrounding
it, obscure earlier Oregon decisions.198 Unlike Prince,which is of real
significance only in Oregon and a few other states, the earlier Oregon
decisions seem to contain raw material for differentiating between
when collateral participants, who seemingly do no more than render
routine professional services, should nonetheless be held as substantial factors, or "substantial contributive factors," and when they
should not be. The "blind eye" and "creation of false appearances"
cases, when a strong inference of knowledge is also present, are cases
in which the professional or other collateral participant who underperforms, or routinely performs, rather than becoming over-involved
in the issuer's solicitation, sales, or similar effort, ought to be held.
E. Antifraud Rules and Implication of PrivateRights of Action
Another and last burning issue under state securities laws is
whether a private right of action for damages lies under state statute's analog to the federal general antifraud rule, rule 10b-5. The alternative view is that the antifraud statutory provision is only a
substantive prohibition. Any liability for a violation of that prohibition must be found in the general, all-purpose civil liability
provision.199
Modeled on Uniform Securities Act section 410, the civil liability
provision does incorporate by reference the antifraud statute and the
registration commands as the substantive violations for which liability will lie under the section. 200 The more comprehensive the ex197. Prince, 764 P.2d at 1372 (emphasis added).
198. Berne & Bregenzer find no deviation from prior decisions: "Prince does no
more than reaffirm the prophylactic rule that is at the heart of the securities laws:
those who are responsible for the misrepresentations made in a securities transaction
must take reasonable steps to determine that there has been compliance with the securities laws." Berne & Bregenzer, supra note 9, at 892.
199. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. v. Rousseff, 537 So. 2d 978, 980 (Fla. 1989).
200. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 21.20.3 40(1) (1989) ("Any person, who offers or
sells a security in violation of any provisions of RCW 21.20.010 [antifraud] or 21.20.140
through 21.20.230 [registration] is liable .... ") (§ 21.20.010 cross-reference added in
1975); see also UNIFORM SECURITIES AcT § 410(a) (1), 7B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 643
(1958) (similar incorporation by reference). But see OR. REV. STAT. § 59.115(5) (1987),
mentioning in the civil liability section's statute of limitations provision "[ain action
under this section ... or ORS 59.135 ....
The latter is the Oregon general antifraud
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press right, the argument goes, the less justification exists for implied
rights of action. But plaintiffs nonetheless argue for a free standing
cause of action for antifraud rule violations. They do so, however,
only as the means to an end.
The end is secondary liability for collateral participants who have
assisted in the misrepresentations or misleading statements. Generally, the primary violator will be liable as a seller under the general
civil liability provision. Under the aiding and abetting construct so
familiar to the federal rule 10b-5 area, 20 1 plaintiffs seek to hold responsible lawyers, accountants and others who have lent substantial
assistance to the primary wrongdoer, or at least they seek to hold liable those secondary defendants that cannot be held under seller, or
20 2
broadened seller, status under the civil liability section.
The Uniform Securities Act itself is inconclusive on the question.
The original civil liability provision ended with a subsection, seemingly dispositive on the issue, that read: "The rights and remedies
provided by this act are in addition to any other rights or remedies
that may exist at law or in equity, but this act does not create any
cause of action not specified in this section .... 203 The limitation,
however, did not prove popular. Only half of the forty or so Uniform
Securities Act jurisdictions adopted it.204 On the Pacific Rim, neither
Washington, Oregon nor Hawaii adopted it.205
Moreover, the commissioners on Uniform State Laws have indicated a belief that primary and secondary liability exists under the
section, going even one better than legislative reenactment. 2o6 In
commentary to the 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act, the
Commissioners state that "Activity which constitutes 'aiding and
statute. The statute of limitations provision thus contemplates a right of action for antifraud violations.
201. See, e.g., Bromberg & Lowenfels, supra note 29, at 639-739.
202. The question is somewhat less crucial in jurisdictions that have chosen not to
follow Pinterv. Dahl and have retained a "substantial factor" or similar test of broadened seller status. See supra notes 129-40, 149-67 and accompanying text.
203. UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT § 410(h), 7B U.L.A. at 644 (1958) (emphasis added)
(cross-reference omitted).
204. See, e.g., Naye v. Boyd, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,980, at 94,811 (W.D. Wash.
1986).
205. Cf.ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.220 (Supp. 1991) (verbatim adoption of Uniform Securities Act § 410(h)).
206. See supra notes 136-40 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of Washington expressly found legislative reenactment of a private right of action under Washington's general antifraud statute. See Kittilson v. Ford, 608 P.2d 264, 266 (Wash. 1980)
("The interpretation of RCW 21.20.010 first announced in Shermer is the better rule.
The legislaturehas not seen fit to disturb it and neither do we.") (emphasis added).
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abetting' also is actionable under the federal rule 10b-5 .... Assuming comparable elements are established, this section should also support an aiding and abetting theory of liability." 207 They then add the
somewhat cryptic sentence, "While civil liability to third persons
would only infrequently result in light of the limitations of Section
605(a) [section 410], this theory would support administrative sanctions against an aider or abettor under this section." 208 The section
seems to give and then take away. All the other evidence on the
existence of an implied right of action is similarly "back and forth"inconclusive at best.
One reasoned decision purported authoritatively to decide the
question. In Naye v. Boyd,209 federal district Judge Barbara Rothstein traced the various twists and turns the Washington antifraud
statute had taken. She found it quite persuasive that only one other
decision, Shermer v. Baker,210 also from Washington, had found liability under the section. She seemed, however, too quick to dismiss
the findings in other cases as dicta. 211 The relative paucity of prior
decisions would thus not be surprising. Not until after the implications of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, and to a lesser extent the later
Pinter v. Dahl, had been fully realized212 did the halcyon days for
plaintiffs in federal courts cease and serious emphasis on state securities laws begin.
The Supreme Court of Washington has itself reserved judgment on
the issue. 213 Moreover, in retaining "substantial contributive factor"
and broadened seller status, the court found highly persuasive the
commentary of the commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 214 If the
court finds highly persuasive the commissioners' opinion on that issue, equally likely is that the court would find persuasive the commissioners' belief that private rights of action exist under the
antifraud statute. The latter would be true if the somewhat cryptic
commentary is interpreted in that manner.
207. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS-PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE, Comment 3 to Uniform Securities Law § 501, at 448 (1985).
208. 1&
209. FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 92,980 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
210. 472 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
211. In Washington alone, at least three other decisions assume the existence of a
cause of action under the section. See, e.g., In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 72,371 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (finding
that in an early case if"the Washington Supreme Court had wanted to reject the existence of an implied right of action, it could have done so ....");Kittilson v. Ford, 608
P.2d 264, 266 (Wash. 1980) (making conscious decision not to disturb earlier Shermer
ruling and finding legislative reenactment); Clausing v. DeHart, 515 P.2d 982, 983-84
(Wash. 1974) (recognizing right of action but finding alleged omission immaterial).
212. See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying text.
213. See Haberman v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 744 P.2d 1032,
1052-53 (Wash. 1987).
214. See id. at 1051.
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One difficulty in the area of state securities laws is that many of
the decisions involve federal courts making educated Erie guesses
about the interpretation of state securities acts. The difficulty is that
the guesses are not educated at all. Federal courts find no cause of
action when the state supreme court has expressly reserved the issue
for later consideration. Federal judges do not rely on state law. They
consult merely their federal brethren's no more educated Erie
guesses on the state law question before them.215 In another way,
their education is imperfect. They consult only opinions that suit
their purposes, no matter how discredited those state law decisions
216

may be.

Failures of federal judges to truly educate themselves about state
law when sitting as an Erie court or deciding pendant claims is documented.2 17 But., in this context, that statement is misleading. The
true or "right" answer is not necessarily the other way. The evidence
as to whether or not a private right of action exists under the Uniform Securities Act antifraud section is conflicting. After a thorough
review, the only answer may be to throw one's hands in the air.
Hands in the air may not be problematic for plaintiffs in jurisdictions such as Oregon and Arizona which have broad "every person
who participates or materially aids" language in their express civil liability provisions. 2 18 In those jurisdictions little need for separate antifraud and aiding and abetting liability exists. 219
215. See, e.g., Wade v. Skipper's, Inc., 915 F.2d 1324, 1330-32 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding
no cause of action, relying almost exclusively on Naye v. Boyd); Russo v. Prudential
Bache, No. C88-895, Order on Post Verdict Motions (W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 1989) (finding
that an implied cause of action "had since been abandoned in Washington").
216. In Naye v. Boyd, Judge Rothstein found Ludwig v. Mutual Real Estate Investors, 567 P.2d 658 (Wash. Rep. 1977) to be a highly relevant Washington Appellate decision. See FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,980, 71,779-80. Ludwig is and was a discredited
opinion. In a gross misreading of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, Lugwig had held that
knowing or intentional conduct was required for liability under the Washington State
antifraud statute. See, e.g., Davis Strout, Comment, Unlawful Securities Transactions
and Scienter: An Emasculation Requirement, 1 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 366, 380
(1978) (Ludwig "constitutes a complete abdication by a Washington court of any role in
policing securities transactions . . ."). On its face, the opinion demonstrated that the
court had probably not read Hoch~felder and can be regarded as, at best, an aberration.
217. See, e.g., David A. Thomas, The Erosion of Erie in the Federal Courts: Is State
Law Losing Ground?, 1 B.Y.U. L. REV. (1977) (study of federal court decisions indicates that federal courts apply the court's own idea of what "the law" is, with little or
no real attention to state law precedents).
218. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
219. The question also has a clear answer in California. California provides an express but grudging remedy for violation of its antifraud rule. California also has an
express aiding and abetting provision but with a high "intent to deceive or defraud"
state of mind requirement. See supra notes 79-81 and 116-25 and accompanying text.
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Hands in the air may be more worrisome in jurisdictions such as
Washington, Alaska or Hawaii in which plaintiffs desire an aiding
and abetting cause of action to cover the territory not reached by an
expanded seller construct. On the other hand, the defense bar has
fewer worries. They applaud federal decisions finding no cause of action under antifraud statutes and, with increased vigor, turn their attention to circumscribing closely, if not hammering down, expanded
seller status under the express liability provision of their respective
state securities laws.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Merely putting upon the table the statutes and case law of five Pacific Rim states' securities laws relevant to collateral participants' liability turns out to have been an exhausting and daunting task. Some
answers emerged but a plethora of questions, some seemingly intractable, remains. Predicting the future actually might be easier than
surveying the past.
The low and across-the-board negligence state of mind standard in
Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions may be a delusion rather than a
benefit. Judges are loath to find liable, for a mere lack of reasonable
care, collateral participants in securities transactions. So judges, especially federal judges reviewing Erie or pendant state securities act
claims, tend to be receptive to defense bar claims that no right of action exists under the antifraud rule, or that any expanded seller status should not exceed the scope of Pinter v. Dahl, or that a civil
liability provision requires transactional, or even strict, passing title
privity. At least the latter may be true when the collateral participant is a professional not intimately involved in the securities transaction. As a result some very culpable collateral participants go free.
In fact, from the plaintiffs' standpoint, the best gift might be evolution of a more forgiving regime in which knowledge would be the
state of mind required to find liability for collateral participants.
That seems to be the result brought about by fifteen to twenty years'
evolution of aiding and abetting under the federal rule 10b-5.22 0 The
pre-Prince v. Brydon decisions in Oregon seem to have arrived at a
similar outcome. 221 The standard Uniform Securities Act framework, found in Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska, does not seem to
have the flexibility to allow such an evolution. By statute California
222
requires "intent to deceive or defraud."
The future may then come full circle. Plaintiffs in states in which
the courts take a restrictive attitude will rely increasingly upon
220. See, e.g., supra notes 32-7 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 168-177 and accompanying text.
222. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25504.1 (West Supp. 1992).
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claims of simple negligence against collateral participants in securities transactions. Those plaintiffs will attempt to slip the bounds of a
common law privity requirement by analogy to the accountant
cases. 223 In a good many jurisdictions, courts have held accountants
liable to third parties with whom they have not dealt if the third
22
party was forseeable, or at least a member of a forseeable class. 4

Post- Pinter v. Dahl at least one state law decision, 225 while applying
Dahl to narrow statutory Uniform Securities Act liability, broadened
greatly a securities lawyer's common law liability by analogy to the
state's accountants' liability precedent.2 26 A great deal of uncertainty, and some seemingly intractable questions, seem to persist in
the area of state securities acts. The way out of the maze may be old,
true and tried common law cases and methods.

223. For decades, of course, the old chestnut has been then Judge Cardozo's holding
in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (holding that
negligent accountants' only liability for negligence was to the client for malpractice).
The famous statement from that opinion is:
If liability [to third parties] for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries,
may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted in these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw
may not exist in the implication of a duty that exist in the implication of a
duty that exposes to these consequences.
Id. at 444.
224. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 2, at 338-41; Edward Brodsky & Richard P.
Swanson, The Expanded Liability of Accountantsfor Negligence, 12 SEC. REG. L. J. 252
(1985); Ronald A. Schy, Privity and Accountants' Liability, 16 SEC. REG. L. J. 54
(1988). California has such a case. See International Mortgage Co. v. John B. Butler
Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227, (1986) (liability "to reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs who rely on negligently prepared... financial statements").
225. Zendell v. Newport Oil Corp., 544 A.2d 878 (N.J. Ct. App. 1988).
226. "[Iln Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983), our Supreme Court
repudiated this privity notion and held that an action for negligent misrepresentation
may be maintained for economic loss against the provider of a service. Rosenblum
held that an auditor owes a duty to all reasonably foreseeable recipients of information
....
Zendell
.
544 A.2d Ct., 881 (reversing summary judgement in favor of Pennsylvania law firm that had done oil and gas limited partnership offering). See also
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (allowing investor plaintiffs to
reach defendant tax lawyer on common law theory because "Indiana does not apply a
privity rule in fraud cases.").
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